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CHIEF JUSTICE NEMETZ'S JUDICIAL RECORD :
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
AND JUDICIAL VALUES
DAVID S. COHENP*

Much of Chief Justice Nemetz's life has been devoted to the public
good and public service -to the betterment of society through law.
Through his judgments and through his contribution to the adminiistration of justice in British Columbia and Canada,, he has brought
the law closer to every one of us. Few of us can appreciate the degree
of sacrifice and dedication to the public good which a life of judging
requires. For all these reasons, and out of respect for the dedication
of the judiciary, lawyers rarely discuss ccjudicialvalues" and particularly the values of a specific judge; to do so risks exposing judges
as human and law as human.
Yet in talking about judicial values -even the values of a particular judge -we are doing much more than talking about the personal values of a specific person, inferred from his behaviour generally. Rather we are describing and evaluating core institutional
values -in particular the ways in which the legal system through
its structure and process defines and proscribes the activity and
choices of judges. Thus my subject is a judge as a member of a small

t

Associate Professor, of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
* Presented 22 March 1988.
@ David S. Cohen, 1988.
1

I am indebted to a student, Suzanne Frost, who asked me a simple question
during a seminar discussion several years ago. "Why," she said, "does government compensation apply only to people who have homes and who have lost
them in a natural disaster, and ignore those who have never had a home?" I
a m also indebted to Jonathan Kozol who, in a two part series on The Homeless published first in the New Yorker, 25 January 1988 and I February 1988,
and then in a book, Rachel and Her Children: Homeless Families In America
( I 988), exposed the tragedy of the homeless in urban America.
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community of judges; and specifically my subject is judicial behaviour on the bench as reflected in the outcome of cases and reasons
for judgment. Whiie judges and lawyers necessarily spend a great
deal of their time involved in individual cases: this series of lectures
in honour of Chief Justice Nemetz permits us the privilege of stepping
back from the day to day process of law, and allows us to think about
the meaning and thus the place of law in Canadian society and the
relationship of law to judicial values.
I have always had difficulty attempting to comprehend the core
value of law.3 Legal academics, judges and lawyers are familiar with
ideas about "the rule of law",4 reasoned argument, principled decision making, the rule of precedent and so on. Yet there always seemed
to me to be something deeper about what law represented in our
social order, something which is independent of the form of legal
argument, the resolution of individual disputes, or debates between
functionalists and rule-governed decision-makers.
In particular, this attempt to articulate the core value of law is
independent of the debate between the rationalists and intuitionists in
explaining judicial behaviour. That is, the core value of law is independent of one's explanation of how judges make choices. It has little
if anything to do with explanations of judicial judgment as the process of logic, information and mechanical jurisprudence, and opposing theories which explain judicial choice as a product of "hunchyy
and intuition and art. I would not even begin to explain or justify
the arguments of Lord Denning that the foundation of law is reliThe core normative idea which I believe is and defines judicial
2

3

4

5

I appreciate that many lawyers in private practice see law as individual cases
and spend their time assisting individual clients. At best, law to practising
lawyers may simply create parameters within which one engages in ad hoc
dispute resolution (among monied classes). Law represents controlled chaos.
What I mean by "core value" is an idea which describes what law is designed
to do, what i t always does and what i t only does. It may extend to an idea
which describes no other social institution, but that is likely an overstatement.
There are many aspects of the rule of law which bear on the topic which I
discuss in this paper. Perhaps the most problematical are decisions, including
those of the Chief Justice, which rely on s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, to require that certain bureaucrats, where they
are invested with judicial authority, cannot be appointed except by the federal
government as superior court judges. I n Concerned Citizens of B.C. v. Capital
Regional District [1g81] I W.W.R. 359, Chief Justice Nemetz held that the
Executive Council of British Columbia- the Cabinet -could not have the
authority to review effluent permits, since in doing so it was exercising judicial
authority, namely reviewing errors of law.
"[Ilf we seek truth and justice, we cannot find it by argument and debate,
nor by reading and thinking, but only by the maintenance of true religion and
virtue." Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Denning, "The Influence of Religion on Law",
33rd Earl Grey Memorial Lecture ( I 953) at no.
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behaviour goes even deeper, is more central than the debate between
rationality and passion. I t is independent of the intellectual processes,
conscious or unconscious, which appear in judgments? It defines
what law is and thus what judges do.
What then is the core idea of law? The question, as I hope to
demonstrate, can only be answered in a very abstract form: law
preserves what we have. Its meaning, however, may be illustrated by
a simple example. Several months ago, when I began thinking about
this paper, I happened to be reading a series of articles on the homeI then realized (and this perhaps simply
less in urban A~nerica.~
reflects my ignorance of the values inhering in law) that law offers
valuable and unique assistance for some homeless families and tragically ignores another group of families which, at least in terms of their
homelessness, are indistinguishable from the firsk8 I would like to
explore the meaning of this discrimination by imagining three homeless families.g
The first homelcs family owned a home in the past, but has had its
home either expr0priated.b~the government or perhaps, as a result
of government or police action, rendered worthless and uninhabitable. It may simply have had its privacy interfered with by an unauthorized police search. If that family goes to a court of law and
argues that it has a legal right to compensation, one can predict with
virtual certainty that it will either have its home returned intact,
receive compensation which will permit it to purchase a homelo or
receive compensation for its losses due to the trespass. That is the
import of the now famous aphorism in Semayne's Case," quoted
by the Chief Justice, that "every man's house is his castle".12
See: J. C. Hutcheson, "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
'Hunchy in Judicial Decisionyy(1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 274; Frank Knight,
"The L i t a t i o n s of Scientific Methods in Economics" in R. G. Tugwell, ed.,
The Trend of Economics (1924) 254.
7 J. KOZO~,
supra, note I.
8 They are distinguishable, of course, in terms of the situation which produced
their homelessness, but they are equally impoverished, equally unable to care
for their children, equally innocent of moral wrongdoing.
9 There is a fourth homeless family ~vhichI discuss later. See infra, note 93.
10 In fact, if there is any ambiguity in deciding if interest is payable on the
award, Chief Justice Nemetz, in ensuring that "the owner is made economiwould award compound interest. See Minister of Highways and
cally ~vholeYy,
Public Works v. British Pacific Properties Ltd. [1g80] 2 W.W.R. 525 at 534
(dissenting).
11 ( I 604) 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 E.R. I 94.
1" Eccles v. Bourque [1g73] 5 W.W.R. 434 a t 449.
0
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The second homeless family has also owned a home in the past,
but has had its home either damaged or destroyed by another person
or has had its privacy interfered with by an intruder. Again, if that
homeless family goes to a judge and asks for compensation from the
person who has caused its loss, it is almost certain that it will receive
compensation which will permit it to restore the home to its pretrespassed position and to compensate it for its losses.''
The third family does not have a home; it does not have shelter."
The parent -the vast majority of the homeless consist of single
parents- and her children live in conditions which we cannot
comprehend :
The rooms for the homeless families had roaches, water seeping
through the ceilings, missing windowpanes, holes in the floor. ...
"Some mornings, there's no food. I give them a quarter if I have
a quarter. They can buy a bag of chips. After school I give them
soup. . .."IS
If that family goes to a judge, assisted by the most persuasive, learned
and experienced lawyer imaginable:' it is certain that the parent will
not obtain a court order awarding her a sum of money to purchase
a home.17 While I might have said that the homeless family would
almost certainly be refused funds or could remain in vacant houses,
one need only refer to the well-known decisions which have evicted
the homeless from abandoned apartments.''
The avaiIability of the trespass action and its importance in protecting the
interests of homeowners is strengthened and emphasized by several subsidiary
elements of the action. For example, unlike most legal actions, the defendant
must prove that she acted unintentionally and without negligence in order to
avoid legal liability. See: Cook v. Lewis [1g51] S.C.R. 830, [rg52] I D.L.R.
I ;Larin v. Goshen (1975) 56 D.L.R. (3d) 719 (N.S.C.A.).
14 The word "home" is likely derived from the Norse word heima, which refers
not only to a place but also to "a comfortable state of being". See W.
Rybczynski, Home: A Short History of an Idea (1986) a t 62.
15 J. KOZO~,
"The Homeless and Their Children -Part 11", The New Yorker,
I February 1988~36
at 52.
l e My thesis is strengthened by the unreality of that statement. Protecting
what we have is an ideology which is reflected in the delivery of most legal
services through the market so that those that have, and those who can afford
legal representation, have their security protected.
17 Some might argue that my last statement is too broadthat is, all I can
and should say is that it is likely that she will not receive funds to purchase
another home, or a t least, if she finds shelter in an empty home, a judge
would not evict her. The open-textured concepts of legal rules with their
resulting indeterminacy would permit a judge to respond to the claim of the
homeless. I agree with the indeterminacy argument.
18 There are several tragic cases in which the courts, while decrying the injury
which they must inflict when they apply the law "as it is", and while alleging
18
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The response of law, the legal system and judges to the three homeless families tells us something profound about judicial values. The
core judicial value which I ~villattempt to describe in this paper
is a norm which forms part of the entire structure of law: it forms
part of all legal principles and rules; it comprises procedure and
evidence; it is reflected in the rhetoric of judgment writing; and it
defines how law is delivered to the community. In doing so I will be
using examples drawn from the judicial record of Chief Justice Nernetz to illustrate the way in which this core judicial value manifests
itself in and constrains judicial decision-making."
I t is not, at least to me, a radical proposition to suggest that the
primary value which drives and justifies judicial behaviour is an
ovenvhelming, almost monistic concern with preserving and securing
This liberal democratic ideal is
to individuals "what they
the commitment of law to liberty and freedom from the actions of
others. And it applies with equal force to protect individuals from
the actions of other individuals and actions of the community or state.
The connection between law as "the individual dispute" with
which we are familiar and law as a social institution preserving liberty is brought out in a recent report on the court system in Ontario.
In 1973 the Ontario Latv Reform Commission, in its Report on

1'

20

that they trust '<charity" to provide for the homeless, have r e a r m e d the
right of property owners to take private measures to evict the homeless and
to obtain judicial orders of eviction, notwithstanding the availability of the
necessity defence. See: Southwark L.B.C.v. Williams [1g71]
Ch. 734;McPhail
v. Persons Unknown [1g73]3 W.L.R. 71. These cases and the values they
reflect are discussed in J. A. G. GrifEth, The Politics of the Judiciary, 2d ed.
(1981) at 137-42.
Before going on I should describe my research technique and its limitations.
With the assistance of the computer research facilities at the Faculty of Law,
I was able to obtain every reported decision with which Chief Justice Nemetz
was involved either as the author of the written reasons, a concurring judge
or as a dissenter. I have thus omitted by far the largest category of judgments
-the Chief Justice's oral judgments. I have been told that they reflect a
consistent concern with social justice and the norms and attitudes of the community. As well, I have been necessarily selective in choosing judgments from
among the many hundreds of written reasons which the Chief Justice has
handed down. The latter limitation has not produced any substantial problems,
for the Chief Justice has been consistent in his ideas throughout his tenure.
Of course, judges also define what individuals have through their definition of
property, liberty, security, privacy, contract, and through their definition of
the permissible ways in which rights are transferred -trust, contract, gift,
testamentary disposition and so on. The way in which this definitional exercise contributes to preserving what we have is somewhat more difficult to
describe since in many cases the definition was created incrementally some time
in the past. Where the judges define those concepts today, the distributional
choices they represent are obvious. See Conclusion.
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Administration of Ontario Courts?l began with the idea that the
basic function of a court system in a civilized society is to impartially
adjudicate disputes without resort to violence. While no one would
disagree with that description, the larger political theory of which it
is a part is apparent in a subsequent discussion of "the independence
of the judiciary" in which Mr. Justice Rand's words are quoted with
approval :

[Ilndependence of judges. . .. enables the guarantee of security to the
weak against the strong and to the individual against the community;
it presents a shield against the tyranny of power .. and against the
irresponsibilityand irrationality of popular action, whether of opinion
or of violence. ...22 [emphasis added].

.

Law is conceived of as a shield -it is a passive rather than activist
social institution -it secures one's welfare against intrusion by the
state, but does not actively engage in assisting those who live in
poverty. Law represents the individual against the community, but
does not assist in the efforts of the community to make the lives of
individuals better. Law's values, if understood in this light, are as
political as any other set of values. Here the political value of law
is that it enables us to live our lives secure in the knowledge that we
will not be subject to arbitrary intrusions on our liberty; we enjoy,
through law, freedom from the state and from others.
Understanding law in this way erases the alleged contradiction
between order and liberty.23 Liberty and freedom from the state
provides security and order to our lives. The law, while it necessarily
invokes non-liberal concepts of restraint and coercion, does so only
to prevent anarchy, and anarchy would, in the eyes of the law, leave
liberty to be ravaged by "the strong or the unscrup~lous".~~
Presented with the hypothesis (at thii stage simply an assertion)
that the law as an instrument of social order is designed to preserve
what we have, three subsidiary questions must be addressed. First,
how does it preserve what we have? Second, and more important,
is preserving what we have a good thing? Third, and most important
of all, can law be used as an instrument of social progress? In the next
1'

22

23
24

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Administration of Ontario
Courts, Part 1 (1973) (Chair: H. Allan Leal).
Ibid. at 7, quoting Hon. I. C. Rand, Report of the Inquiry into the Alleged
Misconduct of Mr. Justice Landreville (1966) at 95-6.
H. Laski, "Law and the State" in H. Laski, Studies in Law and Politics
(1932)See B. N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) at 94.
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two parts I will address the first and second questions, with particular
emphasis on the contribution and role of Chief Justice Nemetz in
the exercise of lawmaking. In the conclusion I will reflect on the
conception of law as an instrument of social progress, which, at
least in the view of some, is the legacy of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.25

I. HOW LAW PRESERVES
The question, "How does law preserve what we have?', can be
addressed at hvo levels. Obviously, law preserves what we have by
recognizing and thus legitimating security of expectations, property
and thus autonomy. However, if law were to be openly recognized as
engaged in that political
it is unlikely that it could generate
the moral legitimacy with which it is associated. Thus the deeper
answer to the question, "How does law preserve what we have?',
is extremely subtle and complicated. I would like to focus on several
aspects of judging and justice which contribute to the legitimacy and
moral authority of law in providing us with security from each other
and the community.27
First, and probably most important, law preserves what we have
by incorporating a corrective rather than distributive model of justice. The idea of corrective justice asks only that we determine
whether one person has unlawfully or wrongfully caused an injury to
another. If the answer to that question is positive, then we demand
that the injurer restore the victim to the position she was in prior to
the ~vrongfulinterference with her rights. The corrective justice
model of lawmaking explicitly denies both the instrumental and
social-ordering ideas which are commonly associated with political
decision-making, and is intimately connected with choices about the
legal liability of individuals to one another, and of the state to individuals in many cases.gs It is quite easy to see that corrective justice

" Part I of the Constitution Act,

1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I I.
2 W y thesis is that judicial decision-making is a manifestation of law as politics.
The law as a political institution performs a function which other political
institutions often do not; it preserves what we have.
27 I must ignore several others. For example, the imposition of judicially created
evidentiary immunities on coroners' inquests to provide witnesses with immunities is an esample of the use of evidentiary rules to limit inquisitorial state
powers. See Re WiLton Inquest (1968) 66 W.W.R. 522 (Nemetz J.A. dissenting).
28 Corrective justice, or rectificatory justice as it is sometimes called, is most
often associated with Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle, The Nicomachean
Ethics, Book V, Chapter 4 (David Ross trans. r 925).
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permits and demands that we compensate the now homeless homeowners, and ignores the plight of the always homeless.
While corrective justice as a model of lawmaking has considerable
intuitive attractiveness, it is not without its failings. For example, it
presumes that we know what individual rights ought to be recognized
when compensation is claimed from the state or other individuals.
That is, corrective justice does not tell us what rights we should
protect from interference. It is clear, for example, that economic
welfare is not, in the abstract, considered to be a right subject to
protection under current applications of the corrective justice model
of tort law.29 The role of law is not only to preserve what we have
but also, by defining property, liberty, contract, privacy and so on,
to create what we have.
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of corrective justice is
an overriding judicial reluctance to impose liability for "inaction".
Briefly, while an individual may be legally responsible to another
for acting in a fashion which injures the other, it is extremely difficult
to persuade a judge that failing to assist another ought to give rise
to legal liability. While this action/inaction has been considerably
modified in Anns v. London Borough County of Merton?' there is
little doubt that judges have retained a requirement that in order to
impose liability the court will demand that the plaintiff demonstrate
that the defendant either acted to induce reliance on her words or
conduct, or created or increased a risk of damage to the injured
The idea in corrective justice that merely failing to help another
will not be a legal wrong is derived, at least in part, from a legitimate
concern that to do so would demand the delivery of benefits to another and thus would constitute an unjustifiable interference with
another's liberty to act as she chooses.32 It finds voice not only in
decisions limiting recovery of damages, but as well in the criminal
29

30

81
32

See: R. A. Posner, "The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories
of Tort Law" ( I 98 I ) I o J. Leg. Stud. 187; R. A. Epstein, "Nuisance Law:
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints" (1979) 8 J. Leg. Stud. 49.
119781A.C. 728, [1g77] 2 AllE.R.492 (H.L.).
See Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. I at 47 per
Brennan J.
Thus the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction has been justified by concerns
with using tort law to "enforce general unselfishness". See: R. L. Hale,
"Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-feasance" ( I946) Colum. L.
Rev. 196 at 215; F. Harper and F. James, Jr., The Law of Torts (1956) at
1049. As Allen Linden put it, the doctrine manifests a concern for "rugged
individualism, self-sufficiency, and the independence of human kind". A. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 4th ed. ( I 988) at 265.
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law, where judges, including Chief Justice Nemetz, are extremely
hesitant to invoke the power of the state against individuals simply for
agreeing to act in a general fashion which may constitute a criminal
offence? or for merely failing to take positive steps to prevent a
crime from being co~nmitted.~~
Second, law preserves what we have not only through its underlying structure as a vehicle of corrective justice, but also through its
rhetoric. In deciding cases, legal rhetoric justifies judicial choice
through reference to rules rather than standards and norms in
decision-makir~g.~"ome writers have presented a dichotomous version of state and
The passive, reactive, libertarian state has its
counterpart in a judicial order which pursues "fair" conflict resolution as a goal of justice. The pursuers present themselves and law as
neutral, objective and scientific technicians who, while they exercise
choice, do so dispassionately and unideologically according to technical standards. Conversely, the activist, progressive state would have
its counterpart in a judicial order which pursues policy implementation and development as a goal of justice. Judges in this latter state
necessarily present themselves and law as non-neutral, and seek to
achieve normative goals drawing on explicit general community
This concern with rhetoric leads one to the most salient characteristic of judicial decision-making -the application of an allegedly determinate legal rule based on precedent to a set of facts.''
Thus, for example, in R. v. Gill ( 1968) 67 W.W.R. 101, Nemetz J.A. set aside
convictions for conspiracy to procure a miscarriage where the Crown prosecutor simply demonstrated a general agreement to refer women to an abortionist
rather than a specific agreement relating to a particular criminal act.
34 Thus in R. v. Bourne ( 1969) 7 I W.W.R. 385, Nemetz J.A., while refusing an
appeal of an accused who had been convicted of possession of heroin, conk e d that more than "mere indifference or negative conduct" was required
to demonstrate joint possession (at 387). Similarly, in R. v. Konken [197I] 3
W.W.R. 752, Nemetz J.A. set aside a conviction of a person who had, after
taking an abandoned pump, discovered that it might belong to someone else
who had lost a similar pump. Nemetz J.A. held that in order to convict for a
"failure to act", unequivocal and unambiguous knowledge that the property
belonged to someone else must be demonstrated.
35 There are exceptions to this idea, including s. 24 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, supra, note 25, which permits a judge to exclude evidence where to admit i t would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
38 See M. R. DamaSka, The Faces of Justice and State Authority ( I 986).
37 Ibid. at 88-9, 168-70.
38 AS Jerome Frank puts it, legal rules generally consist of conditional statements
referring to facts:
For convenience, let us symbolize a legal rule by the letter R, the facts of a
case by the letter F, and the court's decision of that case by the letter D.
33
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Even if one ignores that the set of facts is generated by an extraordinarily limiting set of procedural rules, and the set of legally
relevant facts is itself narrowly defined, one must appreciate that
judges make choices based on these facts in a certain fashion and
that this institutional characteristic has important implications for
the substantive outcome of cases.
The most salient characteristic of judicial decision-making is the
process of reasoning by analogy -the application of a particular
rule enunciated or applied on a past occasion to a relevantly similar
set of facts presented to the decision-maker. The result is, of course,
a significant degree of legitimation of power associated with the
apparent non-human source of authority, a significant risk of perpetuation of err0rs,3~and non-articulation of the justification for the
determination of relevant similarities or differences. The model is
functionally static, involving a process of classifying new factual
situations under existing rules?' At best, stare decisii represents a
decision-making process which is incrementalist -the decisionmaker making margin-dependent choices rather than evaluating all
possible alternatives and making optimising decisions?' Decisionmaking based on precedent and analogy often incorporates unarticulated political, economic and social ideas, and is consistently constrained by its necessarily historical perspective?'

39

40

42

We can then crudely schematize the conventional theory of how courts
operate by saying
RXF=D
I n other words, according to the conventional theory, a decision is a product
ofanRandanI;.
See J. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1950)
at 14.
For example, it is extraordinary that a rule which was developed to respond
to an anachronistic land registry system in England in I 775 would be applied
without significant modification in British Columbia for almost two centuries.
I t was not rejected until Chief Justice Laskin, adopting an unjudicial, functional rhetorical technique characteristic of the American Realists, finally laid
it to rest. See A.V.G. Management Sciences Ltd. v. Barwell Develo#ments
Ltd. [1g7g]2 S.C.R. 43, [1g7g]I W.W.R. 330.
See R. A. Samek, 'The Dynamic Model of the Judicial Process and the Ratio
Decidendi of a Case" (1964)42 Can. Bar Rev. 433.
See: M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comfiarative and Political Analysis ( I 98I ) ;
P.Devlin, The Judge ( I 979).
See B. N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (I 92I ) reprinted in
M. E.Hall, ed., Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo ( I 947) at I 07.
Two relatively minor examples of this rhetorical technique can be drawn
from the Chief Justice's judgments. Thus, for example, in deciding whether a
play should be interpreted as a "publication" in the context of an obscenity
prosecution, judges, including Chief Justice Nemetz, are likely to turn to formal dictionary meanings as justification for their decisions. See R. v. Small
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Judges, in deciding cases, engage in the somewhat paradoxical
exercise of "predicting history". The idea of precedent necessarily
requires deference to superior institutions and to history. Judges, in
deciding what we have, do so not by engaging in broad analysis of
social choice, but by looking to and interpreting the decisions of other
judges in the past. The rhetoric of law is to be bound to follow and
implement decisions in like cases earlier in our history. Judges will
vary considerably in the degree to which they will ignore, manipulate
and adhere to precedent, but that does not deny its power to constrain
judicial choice.
Third, law preserves what we have through its requirement that
judges be independent. Although independence has several components, for our purposes we can limit our analysis to two: first, a
requirement that judges be independent from the current popular
government; and second, that judges be impartial in respect of the
participants and their dispute. The issue is of course of central importance where, as in the case of many claims by citizens, the opponent
is defined as the government.
The role of independence is significant for several reasons. It permits the courts to impose sanctions on and attempt to regulate the
behaviour of the legislative and executive branches of government, at
least temporarilyP3 Courts can articulate and protect the interests of
individuals and minorities without constant review by majoritarian
institutions. And institutional independence achieves a degree of
stability, continuity and thus security in the ongoing definition of
entitlementsf4

43

44

[1973] 4 W.W.R. 563 a t 575. I must point out that the rhetoric is not linked to
the outcome of the dispute, but is a legitimation technique which can be used
to justify either outcome. In Small, Nemetz J.A. found that the trial judge
had misdirected himself, and ordered a new trial. Similarly, the courts consistently interpret legislation as "preserving common law rules", thus implicitly supporting the continuation and preservation of rights which are enunciated through those rules without serious analysis of the implications of that
choice. That is not to say, of course, that the preservation of those common law
rights is undesirable or that laudatory goals are not achieved through that
vehicle. See Myers v. Myers [1979] 4 W.W.R. 353 (Chief Justice Nemetz
holding that the Family Relations Act, S.B.C. 1972, c. 20 is remedial as it is
intended to be in addition to and not in substitution of the common law. In
that case the Chief Justice held that assets were to be divided equally between
a husband and wife based on the equitable concept of a resulting trust.).
Thus independence forms part of the ideology of the rule of law which holds
that both the governed and the governing elites are formally equally amenable
to the same judicial process. A recent example of this idea in practice is the
decision of the Supreme Court to review esecutive decisions to employ nuclear
arms in Canada. See Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen [1985] I S.C.R.
441 at 472.
As Jerome Frank wrote, "[tlradition
is the prime support of social stability," supra, note 36 a t 254.

...
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The formal independence of judges from the political will of the
current government is achieved through the embodiment of the Act
of Settlement in s. gg of the Constitution Act, 1867: This formal
independence is strengthened by associated provisions of the Constitution Act which provide for federal appointments and payment
of salaries fixed by Parliament. I n theory, these provisions insulate
judges from local pressure and reduce the ability of the executive to
use financial coercion to influence judicial behaviour.
However, much more important than formal independence is the
independence associated with the stability of the judicial system. Tenure means that individual judges retain power for extended periods
of time. The judicial appointment process means that new actors are
introduced into the system incrementally. Judges, given their training
in law, experience a significant socialization process during their legal
and professional education which is enhanced by the hierarchical
structure of the courts and seniority systems within the judiciary."'
This experience coupled with the individuation of decision-making
means that judges will be constrained to act consistently over time in
accordance with their definition of relevant generalizations. And
since the relevant generalizations will likely be very similar across
judges, we can expect the curial institution to exhibit considerable
stability in its behaviourP7 I t is this stability which creates the security
which protects what we have.
Related to judicial independence from government is the requirement of impartiality, which might best be described as "unrelatedness, passivity and ignoranceay.First, we demand that the decisionmaker in the curial process be unrelated to the parties, witnesses,
the factual background of the dispute, and the outcome. As Chief
labour arbitrators as
Justice Nemetz wrote in a recent decision:'
4"U.K.),
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. The Act of Settlement, 1701, (U.K.), 12 & 13
Wm. 111, c. 2, provides for the appointment of judges during good behaviour
and their removal only by the Governor General on an address to both the
Senate and House of Commons.
46 Robert Samek calls this the "sub-model of obediencey', supra, note 40 at 435
passim.
47 The process of reasoning which one finds in the case law as well as in constitutional argument is quite simple -like cases should be treated alike. What
makes one case 'like" another, however, cannot be determined by independent criteria; i t depends upon values which may not be articulated. The
stability in law is created by the consistency of judicial values as much as by
.anything else.
48 Refrigeration Workers Union, Local 516 v. Labour Relations Board of British
Columbia [1g86] 4 W.W.R. 223 at 228, quoting Rand J. in Szilard v. Szasz
[1g55] S.C.R. 3 a t 4. In this case, the Chief Justice refused to permit the
Labour Relations Board from appointing a union member to a panel not-
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administrative decision-makers engaged in judicial activities must act
with "free, independent and impartial mindsyy.Second, we demand
"ignoranceyyin the sense that we demand that the judge receive her
first knowledge of the factual dispute through the formal presentation
of information by the parties. And third, we require that the judge
remain relatively passive throughout the proceedings -the archetypal neutral umpirePg It is facile to think that impartiality means
that judges have no views as to right and wrong, no intuitions as to
moral judgment, no connection to the current government and no
policy inclinations." Fact-finding, the interpretation of statutes and
cases, the exercise of choice in applying concepts of reasonableness
and a myriad of similar facts all involve political, economic, social
and moral reasoning. Nonetheless, we have conventionally presented
the judge as being a "political, economic, and social eunuch" who
has no interest in the world outside hi judgments.51
There is little doubt that Chief Justice Nemetz considers judicial
independence as constituting the core of his institutional character;
in h
is writing he has described it as "a fundamental pillar of our
democratic
and has applied rigorous standards to administrative decision-makers who have been challenged for bias. He appreciates that the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends more on
the perceived and actual independence of the judiciary than on the
substantive outcome of their choices. Nonetheless, recognizing that
judges are independent in the senses I have described does not mean
that the law and the judiciary as institutions are impartial in determining the claims of the truly homeless and the homeless who have
lost their homes. It does not mean impartiality as between the treatment of claims which have been recoopized in the past and the
treatment of not yet recognized claims in the future.
withstanding that the individual was a person of both integrity and high
qualification in his field.
49 See Denning L.J. in Jones v. National Coal Board [1g57] 2 K.B. 55 a t 64.
At the same time, lawyers will generally hold the view that overtly "political"
appointments are undesirable. By political I mean the appointment of judges
who are connected through past experience or relationships with the current
government. The major concern voiced in this context is that "quiet patronage appointments to the judiciary of people such as former Manitoba premier
Sterling Lyon have demeaned the judicial process and brought it into disrepute," see K. Martin, "Scrutinize All Judicial Appointments, Lawyers'
Group Urges", The Globe and Mail (30 January 1987).
61 J. A. G. Griffith, supra, note 18 at 204.
GWemetz C.J.B.C., "The Concept of an Independent Judiciary" (1986) 20
U.B.C. L. Rev. 285 at 291.
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Fourth, the core value of law in preserving what we have is reflected and emphasized by the institutional characteristics of the
courts, and in particular by the limited self-defined remedial powers
which judges exercise.53 Dichotomous determinations of right and
wrong coupled with a binding award of monetary compensation and
perhaps injunctive relief to restore or preserve the status quo, I think
accurately describes traditional judicial remedial authority. Again,
one can easily find in Chief Justice Nemetz's judicial record references to the limited remedial authority which courts should exerci~e?~
I n general judges have adopted an extremely conservative set of
remedial tools: awards of damages, limited negative injunctions and
declarations being the most common.
I n all cases judicial remedies represent the remedial component
of a model of law which will necessarily preserve and restore individuals to their pre-injured state. The shortcomings of this model
which significantly limit the ability of the institution to effect fundamental structural reform are amplified when applied to the case of
governmental wrongs.55This description of judicial remedial instruments might be contrasted with the remedial instruments of ombudsman offices, a non-legal institution which, while independent from
the current government, is not impartial. Ombudsman ofices are
55

I n fact, the entire institutional design of the court system reinforces protecting
what one has. For example, the obvious fact that the Canadian legal system
can be invoked, as a practical matter, only by the more wealthy, and when
invoked can be utilized extensively by that group, reinforces the idea of law
as preserving what one has. As recently as 1970, Nemetz J.A. could not disregard the amount of a lawsuit in exercising his discretion to give leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada even though no issue of public interest or important question of law was present. See Royal Trust Company v.
Ford and Christ Church Cathedral Buildings Ltd. (1970) 73 W.W.R. I at 7.
Yet at the same time, the Chief Justice was extremely sensitive to the failings
of the legal system to ensure adequate criminal representation. I n R . v. Johnson [1g73] 3 W.W.R. 513, Nemetz J.A. allowed an appeal from a trial in
which Johnson was convicted without an adequate professional defence.
Another example is the extremely archaic class action processes in Canada,
which represent an almost insurmountable obstacle to access to the legal system by large groups of individuals who have suffered relatively minor losses
or are seeking legislative review. Here again, Chief Justice Nemetz is somewhat paradoxical. His decision in Shaw v. The Real Estate Board of Greater
Vancouver [1g73] 4 W.W.R. 391 is one of the very few progressive class
action decisions in Canada. As Nemetz J.A. put it, the purposes of class actions
are "to provide an inexpensive means of preventing the frustration of justice
by costly .litigation" (at 402).
See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Western
Wholesale Drug Ltd. (1969) 68 W.W.R. ngg at 302 (injunction issued
against defendant employer to restrain unfair labour practices must "delineate,
wherever practicable, the precise acts or classes of acts which are intended to
be enjoined").
See H. J. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 4th ed. (1981) at 355-7.

..
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characterized by investigatory, bureaucratic, non-binding interest
mediation models of dispute resolution. The outcome is often to
explain and disclose the basis for bureaucratic action, to improve
bureaucratic processes, and to recommend and perhaps to procure
appropriate remedies including information, the delivery of social
benefits through the reversal of bureaucratic decisions, and compensation. Similarly, one might develop structural injunctions which
can be used by the judiciary through the appointment of administrative officers to compel the delivery of prison services and educational
programs to ensure that constitutional violations are not ~ommitted.'~
Incorporating a model of corrective justice, employing historically
focused precedent based decision-making, insisting on judicial independence and impartiality and applying extremely limited remedial
sanctions all combine to define law as an institution which will necessarily result in the preservation of what we have. Indeed it is difficult,
if one takes judicial decision-making seriously, to imagine that it
could do anything else.

11. THE GOODNESS O F SECURITY
Given my description of how law preserves what we have, we can
address the second question, which, not surprisingly, is much more
difficult to answer - "Is preserving what people have a good thing?"
Perhaps the dimensions of the problem can be understood if the question were rephrased - "Is preserving property and liberty a good
thing?" There is, sadly, no answer to that question; or rather there
are two answers which are contradictory.
First, knowing whether securing what we have is good depends on
our definitions of liberty, property and so on. Chief Justice Nernetz,
throughout the course of hi judicial career, has articulated and expressed his ideas on several fundamental characteristics of civil liberty which the law preserves -the privacy of one's home, religious
freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of contract and freedom from
physical incarceration.
The property one has in one's home is, as we all know, a central
theme in the common law process. Nemetz J.A. in Eccles v. Bourque6'
applied an extremely restrictive interpretation of the Criminal Code5'
56

67

5.3

As Owen Fiss has put it in The Civil Rights Injunction ( 1g78), the structural
injunction represents an injunction "seeking to effectuate the reform of a
social institution" at g.
Supra, note 12.
R.S.C.1970, C. C-34, S. 450.
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in refusing to permit the police to rely on a defence unavailable to
private citizens when they (the police) unlawfully entered Eccles'
apartment in pursuit of a fugitive. The police were not in uniform,
but were visibly armed; they did not request pennission to enter the
apartment, but pushed the door open. Eccles sued for damages and
was successful at trial. Nemetz J.A., dissenting on appeal, would have
affirmed the trial decision, arguing that ccscrupulousadherence must
be had for the principles set out at common law" which replate the
conduct of the police in entering a house without a warrant.6DProperty, not as an end in itself but as an aspect of liberty and privacy
and family, is thus defended from interference by the state.
Similarly, the protection afforded to political debate and commentary -the liberty to speak one's conscience -has been rigorously defended in the political idea of liberalism and by the Chief
Justice. In Vander Zalm v. Times Pub2ishersG0Chief Justice Nemetz
delivered the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal which overturned the trial decision and dismissed Vander Zalm's action for
defamation arising out of the publication of a cartoon which depicted him, representing the Miniitry of Human Resources, plucking
wings from a fly. The idea of freedom of speech -that "the public
interest requires that. . .public conduct. . .be open to the most
searching critici~m"~'
-is an aspect of liberty in democratic societies
which has been constantly defended by the Chief Justice, not only
in the Vander Zalm decision but elsewhere as well?'
The Chief Justice's concern with freedom of political debate evidenced in the Vander Zalm decision is linked to a broader concept of
intellectual and personal autonomy that is reflected in his decisions
which respect religious conviction. In R. v. DavieG3an accused who
Sufira, note 12 a t 450.
80 [1g80]4 W.W.R. 259.
61 Ibid. a t 261, quoting Bain J. in Martin v. Manitoba Free Press Co. (1892) 8
Man. R. 50 at 72.
62 See Pacific Press Ltd. v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia 119771 5
W.W.R. 507 (B.C.S.C.). In this case, Nemetz C.J.S.C. used the Canadian Bill
of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. 111, to quash warrants which were used to seize
material from The Vancouver Sun. He held that a justice of the peace, in
deciding to issue a warrant against a newspaper which may have the effect of
impeding its publication, must have regard to the special place of a free press
under the Bill of Rights, ss. I (f) and 2. He held that the Justice did not consider whether alternative sources of information were available and whether
reasonable steps had been taken to obtain the information from those
sources.
83 [1g81] 2 W.W.R. 513.
59
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had been charged with arson was left alone in a room which was
equipped with a hidden microphone and video camera. After the
police left the room, the accused dropped to his knees, saying
"0 God, let me get away with it just this once." The trial judge
refused to admit the statement, holding that it was an unauthorized
interception of a private communication, and thus was inadmissible
under s. 178 of the Criminal Code. The Chief Justice, dissenting,
would have confirmed the trial judgment. The Chief Justice held
that the statement was a private communication within s. I 78. I 6 ( I )
of the Criminal Code. As he put it: "To hold othenvise not only
would violate . ..the purpose of the Act but would also . . .be repugnant to all who hold religious beliefs, and thus contrary to the public
intere~t."~
The Chief Justice has also employed law to protect one's liberty to
contract from government interference. Liberty to contract encompasses not only activities designed to maximize profit, but also extends
to the liberty to engage in activities to improve one's well-being, as
well as to activities through which one defines one's most personal
relationships with others. Chief Justice Nemetz has recognized the
significance of contract as a liberal concept both in common law
contract decisionsGkdin constitutional litigation. In Bhindi and
London v. British Columbia Projectionists' Local 34866the Chief
Justice was faced with an argument that a collective agreement which
included a "closed shop" provision should be held unenforceable as
contravening the Charter of Rights and Freed0ms.6~The Chief
Justice interpreted s. 26 of the Charter as including the "ability
04

05

"
=7

Ibid. a t 5 19.
Common law contract decisions support liberal notions of contract through the
adoption of concepts which preserve enforceability in the face of regulatory
schemes which require licensing of certain contracting agents, and which
arguably would be strengthened if the courts were to declare illegal those contracts entered into by unlicensed individuals. Chief Justice Nemetz's decisions
in this contest are consistent with judicial attitudes promoting contract
enforcement. See Davidson and Co. v. McLeery (1970) 75 W.W.R. 278
(contract for sale of shares enforceable notwithstanding that the Securities
Act, 1962, S.B.C. 1962, c. 55, required licensing of salesmen).
Similarly, the courts have been reluctant to set aside contracts where arguments are made that the contract is a product of economic coercion associated
with monopoly power or consumer ignorance. See Arrow Transfer Co. v.
Royal Bank of Canada [1g71] 3 W.W.R. 241 a t 265 where Nemetz J.A. enforced a verification agreement entered into nobvithstandiig allegations that
the banks had colluded to produce a standard contract imposed on consumers generally in the industry.
[1g86] 5 W.W.R. 303.
Su#ra, note 25.
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to enter into private contractsn,6* and encouraged by American
authority, refused to subject contract and other "purely private
action" to the principles and constraints embodied in the Charter.
As the Chief Justice put it: "To include such private commercial
contracts under the scrutiny of the Charter could create havoc in the
co~llxnerciallife of the country."69
Finally, law protects one's physical liberty. The core of the liberal
idea of law is to prevent, except under extraordinarily stringent procedures, incarceration of private citizens by the state. One can point
to a number of instances in the Chief Justice's record where his concern with personal freedom is readily apparent; as the Chief Justice
has said, "any ambiguity . . . must be resolved in favour of the
liberty of the s~bject."'~This concern with the protection of physical
liberty reached its ultimate expression in the participation of the
Chief Justice in Reference Re Section g4(2) of the Motor Vehicle
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 2887 in which the Court of Appeal held
unconstitutional those provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act which
provided for a mandatory jail term for persons convicted of driving
while their licences were suspended without regard to either their
negligence or intent to commit a crime. The Court, on one view,
radically altered the balance between the judiciary and legislative
institutions, by reviewing not only the procedural safeguards required
by ideals of justice, but the content of the legislation itself. The decision was motivated by judicial abhorrence of the idea that a person
could be imprisoned without the opportunity to demonstrate an
68

69

70

71

Supra, note 66 at 3 I I.
Ibid.
R . V. Turcotte and Parkinson (1969) 69 W.W.R. 705 at 720. In this case
Nemetz J.A. dissented from a decision which would have permitted the Court
to use the provisions of the Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1952, C.
217, to impose indeterminate sentences on young offenders, thus increasing
the sentences imposed under the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 38.
Nemetz J.A. held that in order to permit more severe sentences, one would
have to be able to point to an express legislative provision to that end.
As well, a concern with the protection of physical liberty from interference
by the state is manifested in the establishment of stringent procedural rights
including the right to a public trial: R. v. N. [1g80] I W.W.R. 68 (Juvenile
Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3, while it mandates trials "without
publicity" should not be interpreted as permitting trials to be held "in
camera"). I t is reaffirmed in decisions which affirm the great importance of
burdens of proof and the requirement that the Crown prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offence charged. See R. v. Biedler [I9751 3
W.W.R. 381 (B.C.S.C.) (Crown must prove that proceedings were commenced within limitation period established under the Securities Act, 1967,
S.B.C. I 967, c. 45).
1198313 W.W.R. 756.
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honest and reasonable mistake, or to prove that he acted without a
guilty intent?'
If one takes the judicial record of the Chief Justice one finds one's
personal right to one's home, freedom of speech and political debate,
freedom of contract and physical liberty as describing the content of
liberty. That content leaves no doubt in most of our minds that "preserving what we haveyyis good. But there is mother issue.
More important than understanding the content of liberty and
security of the person, a decision as to whether security and liberty
is good depends on the identity of the person being asked the question.
If one has those things which are preserved -liberty, ideas, ethical
values, a family, property, a home -the answer is yes. And it is true
to say that everyone has something. Not only is it a good thing, but
it is inconceivable how we could exist as individuals or part of a
community without it. Similarly, if one is relatively well-endowed
either with wealth or abilities and has enjoyed an environment which
has nurtured the development of her personal faculties, then again
the answer is yes. For by promising security, one can apply oneself
with the kno.rvledge that the future products of one's labour will be
preserved. Security and the promise of security are things we all
want. It permits us to plan our personal lives, it provides incentives
for and facilitates economic investment, and it reduces the risks of
whatever propensity we might have to engage in private violent
redress.
While I can say that providing security is a good thing, I can also
say that it is not enough. The idea of security and liberty ignores one's
connection with the larger society in which we live. The model of
man which is incorporated in the liberal idea of law, if left at that,
is one in which individuals apparently care little except for themselves. All of the ideas comprising the preservation of liberty are of
little if any value to the homeless. Not only do they have nothing,
they r d I have nothing unless we do something for them, and we have
seen that law, while it preserves what one has, will not actively assist
those who may need what we have. To say that liberty must be constrained by community interests is not to say that liberty is bad, but
rather that "monism" of any sort is dangerous. Because equality,
justice, political participation and so on are important political values
in Canada does not entail that liberty is unimportant.
72

The Court, ibid. at 764, accepted the statement of Dickson C.J.C.that "there
is a generally held revulsion against punishment of the morally innocent."
R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie 119781 2 S.C.R. 1299 at 1310, (1978) 85 D.L.R.
(3d) 16I at I 70.
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The obvious response to this commentary on law is a relatively
simple question-"How can I expect judges to do this?" They do not
have the authority to do so; they do not have the knowledge or expertise to do so; they do not have the administrative staffs to deliver
social services to the homeless; they do not have the resources to allocate to the homeless. And so on. Some of those arguments have merit.
My answer is that I don't expect judges to do this. Rather, my purpose in presenting the values of judges in this fashion is to point out
that law, whether it would preserve what we have or redistribute
wealth, is as much as any other form of justice a political institution.
We should admit that law doesn't assist the homeless, but that does
not mean that we should not make the choice as a society to do so.

111. CONCLUSION
Which brings me to the final question. If I am right about this
core judicial value, how can anyone expect law to be an instrument
of social change? Certainly law is interstitially progressive. As I explained earlier, by protecting future entitlements, law facilitates
human action.73Second, and again thii is reflected in Chief Justice
Nemetz's judgments, law is not stagnant. At best, stare decisis represents a decision-making process which is incrementalist, the decision
maker making margin-dependent choices rather than evaluating all
possible alternatives and making optimizing decisions.74But there is
nothing in law which permits one to say that it is designed to do this,
and there is nothiig in law which suggests that interstitial progress
will be able to respond positively to the claims of the third homeless
family.
Some might argue that the CharterT5has transformed law, and that
while the law of the past is not progressive, the law of the future will
be. One might argue that one progressive idea in the Charter is that
of equality -and in particular a right of equal benefit of the law
under s. 15. But here we are concerned not with equality as between
individuals, but with equality between groups -an idea which Chief
Justice Nemetz invoked in the now famous decision of R. v. Burnshine.?" In that case the Chief Justice used the Canadian Bill of
Rightf7 to strike down the "indeterminate sentence" provisions of
7S
74
75

S. Coval and J. C. Smith, Law and Its Presuppositions (1986).

Supra, note 4 I.
Supra, note 25.
[1g74] 3 W.W.R. 228.
R.S.C. 1970,App. 111, s. I (b).
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the federal Prisons and Reformatories Act7' which applied only to
British Columbians.
The relevance of equality to the homeless lies in the transformation
of economic inequality, traditionally a private issue, into a public,
legal and constitutional question. Arguments have been made in the
United States that the distribution of public services (from the most
mundane street repair work to public educational expenditures)
across communitiesso as to leave some groups less well off than others
Sadly, the paradigm of law necesconstitutes unequal treat~nent.'~
sarily constrains the power of the idea of equal treatment to respond
to the homeless and economically disadvantaged.
A powerful example of the limits of law, as I have attempted to
describe it, is the recent judicial and political clash in British Colurnbia over social welfare funding. We can begin with the decision of
the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Silano v. The Queen in
In that case John Silano challenged
Right of British Col~mbia.8~
regulations enacted under the Guaranteed Available Income for
Need Act? which provided $25.00 less per week to single social
welfare recipients under twenty-six years of age. The Court struck
down the regulations as contravening s. 15 of the Charter. As Spencer
J. held, $25.00 is "of real importance to many of those
There are two problems facing those who would point to this as
an example of the progressive character of the Charter. That is, to
applaud this decision ignores both a critical assumption underlying
the decision as well as the final outcome in the dialogue between
welfare recipients, the courts and government. The critical assumption, of course, is the existence of the G.A.I.N. Act. The equality
provisions of the Charter cannot justify judicial provision of welfare
benefits or programs for the homeless; the judicial act is only supplementary to political choice. The critical outcome is the response of
the government in the Silano case -to reduce the level of payments
to all G.A.I.N. recipients rather than raise the level of the less well
off. Here the judicial act is only preliminary to political ch0ice.8~
78

TD

61
82

83

R.S.C. 1970,~.P-21,~.
150.
See C. M. Haar and D. W. Fessler, The Wrong Side of the Tracks (1986).
1198715 W.W.R. 739.
R.S.B.C. 1979,c. 158, Reg. 479/76, Schedule A, s. 4 [re-en. Reg. 65/84, s. 3;
am. Reg. 155/87, s. 21.
Supra, note 80 at 741.
See B. Parfitt and M. Cernetig, "Welfare War Vowed Over Cuts", The
Vancouu~rSun(14Augus.t 1987) A-1-2.
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If equality rights can do little for the homeless, can liberal rights
of "liberty and security of the person" do more? That isy law can
also be progressive through a redefinition of liberty or property to
encompass more than those aspects of welfare protected at common
law. I n defining liberty to include the power of control over one's
reproductive system the Supreme Court of Canada has improved the
welfare of women in ways which I cannot begin to c ~ m p r e h e n d . ~ ~
Liberty can include more than freedom from others and the community. As Madam Justice Wilson said in Jones v. T h e
it can include the right to raise and educate one's children without
conforming to state-mandated educational programs:
[ q h e framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing "liberty" as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society had in mind the freedom of the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full,
to plan his own life to suit his own character, to make his own choices
for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even eccentric. ...86
Chief Justice Nemetz's remarks in Robson v. The Queens7 predated
those of the Supreme Court of Canada in Jones. In Robson the
accused was convicted for driving while prohibited from doing so,
after his licence was suspended by a police officer at a roadside alcohol
check. The Chief Justice began by disavowing any attempt to incorporate property rights into the Charter's liberty concepts. He continued by defining liberty as encompassing more than the idea of
"mere freedom from bodily
and extended it to include
"the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue and
. ..cannot be restrained except for propergovernmental objective^."^^
[Nemetz C.J.B.C.'s emphasis] While those words might be inter84

85

86
87

88
89

The same ideas about liberty, however, can explain decisions at common law
which made it extremely difficult to convict abortionists. See supra, note 33.
Similarly, in Carruthers and Whelton v. Langley [1g86] 2 W.W.R. 459, the
Chief Justice participated in a per curiam decision of the Court of Appeal
which refused private citizens permission to bring an action which was intended to force Lions Gate Hospital to abide by s. 25 I of the Criminal Code,
supra, note 58, in a particular fashion.
[1g86] 2 S.C.R. 284, (1986) 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569.
Ibid. at 3 18 S.C.R., at 582 D.L.R. (dissenting).
( 1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) I 12. In a later decision, Hundal v. Superintendent of
Motor Vehicles [1g85] 5 W.W.R. 4 9 , the Chief Justice held that s. 86 of the
Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, C . 288, did not deprive the accused of his
liberty to drive without due process of law, given the procedural structures
established in the Act.
Ibid. at I 14.
Ibid. He adopted the words of Chief Justice Warren in Bolling v. Sharpe
( 1954) 347 u-s.497.
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preted as encompassing positive rights to public benefits, it is clear
that the idea of liberty is still that of liberty from state interference,
rather than liberty to obtain things one does not already have from
the state?O This point is made forcefully by Madam Justice Wilson
in Jones, where she argues that :
Of course, this freedom is not untrammelled. We do not live in splendid isolation. We live in communities with other people. Collectivity
necessarily circumscribes individuality and the more complex and
sophisticated the collective structures become, the greater the threat
to individual liberty in the sense protected by s. 7 [of the Charte~-I.g1

Thus neither liberty or equality ~villlikely permit law to be progressive in the sense of providing a vehicle to assist the third homeless
family in my original example. To fully appreciate why this is so,
one might imagine the implications of a progressive legal system.
When law "develops" even incrementally and thus does more than
preserve, it must redistribute; to expand or modify an interest or an
aspect of individual welfare is usually nec=arily to subtract from or
modify an aspect of collective or personal welfare currently enjoyed
by a different group or individual. Thus regardless of one's views of
the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgentaler v. The Queen,g2
by expanding liberty to include reproductive choice, we have undoubtedly redistributed power away from men.03 Regardless of one's
views of the relative deservedness of the three homeless families, if
judges were to provide housing to the third homeless family, they
would have to demand the resources necessary to do so from the
population at large. One obvious way in ~vhichthe problem of
redistribution is hidden is through a legal system which is defined by
preserving only what one has.
Conceiving of law as progressive, as demanding the redistribution
of wealth rather than merely correcting injustices, leads some to
argue that to do so crosses illegitimately the boundary into the legislative arena, which is the forum in which redistribution takes place.
At the same time, the liberty to drive has its source in a government-issued
licence, and thus this case may be used to establish more general property
rights in government benefits.
Ul
Supra, note 85 at 3 19S.C.R., a t 582 D.L.R.
92 [1g88]I S.C.R. 30, (1988)44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
03 An obvious rationale for a non-redistributive judiciary is that the interests of
those who are less well off as a result of the redistribution are, given the current design of judicial process, not represented in the process. The response
to this, of course, is to argue for a new institutional design, not to argue
against redistribution.
DO
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There is, however, considerable debate as to whether redistribution
takes place as it ought to in the legislative arena -the political power
of the homeless is somewhat of a contradiction in terms.= More important, to say that it ought to be legislatures which redistribute
points out that ''law as justice" embodied in the Charter is not the
answer to some of the more tragic social ills which we experience.
Law does some things very well and other things not well at all.
People who hope that the Charter will assist them in obtaining what
they do not have wiu have two thousand years of corrective justice
to overcome.
So in the end we will never know how the Chief Justice as a judge
could have possibly responded to the third homeless family. The
legal system does not recognize it and there is little in law which
permits a compassionate person to respond to its requests for help.
94

This point can be appreciated by considering a fourth homeless family. This
family owned a home in the past, but is homeless as a result of a natural disaster. Here one finds very well-developed and sophisticated government programs to assist this group of homeless in dealing with the trauma of dislocation and in rebuilding their lives and homes. See supra, note g.
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